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Introduction
The 2009 Copenhagen climate summit may in retrospect prove a critical turning point in the evolution of 
the international climate change effort. For a decade and a half, the principal aim under the U.N. Framework 
Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) had been to establish, and then to extend, a legally-binding regime 
regulating greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions. Despite late efforts to temper hopes for Copenhagen, the general 
expectation was that the summit would carry forward this process by producing a legally-binding outcome. The 
result, instead, was the Copenhagen Accord, a non-binding agreement that captured political consensus on a 
number of core issues but in the end was not formally adopted by the official Conference of the Parties (COP).
Copenhagen’s “failure” has led many in and outside governments to begin rethinking the best way to 
mobilize an effective international response to climate change. To be certain, many parties remain fully 
committed to achieving new legally-binding commitments as quickly as possible; some are looking to do so at 
the 17th Conference of Parties (COP-17) to be held in 2011 in South Africa, or at Rio+20, the summit to be 
held in 2012 to commemorate the 20th anniversary of the Earth Summit in Rio de Janeiro. But many others 
are coming to believe that the path to a new legally-binding agreement will be longer and more incremental. 
In this view, the process of constructing a post-2012 international climate architecture will involve a gradual 
process of evolution. 
U.N. Secretary General Ban Ki-moon, who had been among the most ardent voices for a comprehensive 
binding outcome in Copenhagen, has in its aftermath focused more on the need for “tangible progress” in 
specific areas.1 Similarly, Christiana Figueres, the newly appointed UNFCCC Executive Secretary, has eschewed 
the “big bang theory” of climate treaty-making in favor of “incremental steps” that gradually strengthen the 
global effort.2
 An evolutionary path is, in fact, quite common in multilateral regime-building. While the progression of 
every regime is unique, reflecting its particular policy needs and political constraints, broad patterns can be 
seen. Few regimes spring forth wholly formed. Generally, they grow over time, becoming broader, deeper and 
more fully integrated as parties gain confidence in one another, and in the regime itself.
What a more incremental approach would imply in the case of climate change is not necessarily clear, 
however. Short of a legally-binding agreement, what types of international arrangements are most urgent 
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or effective? Which of these can or should be pursued through the UNFCCC and which might be more 
productively pursued in other international forums? Is it critical that we know now the form of legally-binding 
agreement we aspire to—must it, for instance, include the Kyoto Protocol—or can that unfold over time?
This paper starts to explore these and related issues. It argues that a comprehensive and binding global 
agreement has strong virtues, and should be the ultimate goal, but that in working toward that end, parties 
should focus their efforts for now on concrete, incremental steps both within and outside the UNFCCC. The 
paper proceeds as follows: First, it examines why international regimes often evolve gradually over time, rather 
than emerging all at once. Next, it unpacks the various dimensions along which international regimes evolve. 
Then, it examines how the climate change regime has evolved to date. Finally, it outlines several different lines 
along which the climate change regime might evolve in the future.
Of course, an evolutionary process is by definition gradual and will take time. Given the urgency of 
addressing climate change, there is no guarantee that this process will reduce emissions quickly enough 
to avert catastrophic climate change. If a more rapid process were possible, it would be worth pursuing. 
The paper does not argue that an evolutionary approach is best; rather, it concludes that, at present, an 
evolutionary process is politically the most promising way forward. 
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I. How and Why International Regimes Evolve
International regimes rarely emerge in a single step, fully formed. Instead, a regime—as well as the 
broader set of agreements and institutions addressing an issue area, often referred to as a “regime complex”3—
typically evolves over time. The world trade regime, for example, looks very different now than it did in the 
1950s and 1960s. Initially, the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) was adopted only provisionally, 
its legal basis was unclear, and it did not establish any formal international institution or provide for dispute 
settlement. Today, the World Trade Organization (WTO) is an established international organization, with a clear 
legal basis and a highly-developed dispute settlement system. Similarly, the European human rights system 
began as a relatively weak institution, with many countries not accepting the compulsory jurisdiction of the 
European Court of Human Rights or the right of individuals to submit complaints. Today, the European human 
rights system has emerged as a powerhouse, with all member states accepting the right of individual petition 
and the compulsory jurisdiction of the Court, a consolidated and streamlined institutional structure and 
procedure, and a heavy caseload.
There are many reasons why international regimes often develop in an evolutionary manner. First, political 
consensus about whether a problem exists—and, if so, how to address it—often takes considerable time to 
emerge. When states adopted the Long-Range Transboundary Air Pollution Convention (LRTAP) in 1979, there 
was little agreement about the severity of the acid rain problem or the need for a strong regulatory response. 
So, in lieu of commitments, LRTAP provided for monitoring and scientific research, which helped reduce 
uncertainty and convince states about the need for action, paving the way for the eventual adoption of detailed 
protocols addressing the various pollutants that contribute to acid rain.
Second, an evolutionary process allows for trial and error. States can see whether a particular policy 
approach works before deciding what to do next. For example, they can set standards on a voluntary, non-
binding basis, before deciding whether to convert the voluntary regime into a binding one. This was how the 
regimes addressing exports of hazardous wastes and chemicals evolved. Initially, states established systems of 
prior informed consent on a voluntary basis, through guidelines and a code of conduct; later, they used these 
voluntary systems as the basis to develop legally-binding treaties.
Third, in environmental regimes, there is a particular need for flexibility and evolution, because our 
understanding of problems is likely to change as science and technology develop. So regimes need to be able 
to respond in a flexible manner. For example, the Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone 
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Layer contains a flexible adjustment procedure to ratchet up the level of control measures on ozone-depleting 
substances in response to new evidence.
Finally, in order to make binding international commitments, states need to have confidence and trust in a 
regime. Generally, trust emerges only slowly over time, as an institution develops a track record that states can 
evaluate. For example, states may ultimately be willing to accept the compulsory jurisdiction of a third-party 
decision-maker, such as the European Court of Human Rights or the WTO dispute settlement body, but only if 
they have confidence that the decision-maker will act in an impartial, fair manner, within its mandate. 
Although many regimes have developed in an evolutionary manner, there is nothing inevitable about 
regime evolution. Whether and the degree to which a regime evolves depends on a variety of factors, including 
whether the level of political will to address a problem grows. Often, regimes develop in fits and starts. Indeed, 
at times regimes even move backwards as interest in an issue ebbs or when a regime has moved ahead too 
quickly, ahead of what the political traffic will bear. For example, the Security Council’s authority over the use 
of force has waxed and waned over the last 60 years since the establishment of the United Nations, rather 
than evolved in a consistent direction. Following the end of the Cold War, the Security Council’s success in 
responding to the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait led some to herald the beginning of a “new world order,”4 but in 
the ensuing decade its authority declined and was further undermined by the U.S. decision in 2003 to invade 
Iraq without explicit Security Council authorization. Even as highly successful a regime as the European Union 
has suffered significant setbacks along its evolutionary path, including the Luxembourg Compromise in 1966, 
which limited the majority voting rule provided for in the Treaty of Rome.5
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II. Dimensions of Regime Evolution
Regimes can evolve along one or more dimensions. First, they can become deeper. Second, they can 
become broader. Third, they can become more integrated. Or fourth, they can evolve along multiple dimensions 
at once.6
Deepening
Often, regimes start out quite shallow, with weak obligations, and gradually become deeper over time. The 
depth or strength of a regime is a function of several factors: the authority of its institutions, its legal form, the 
stringency and precision of its commitments, and the strength of its review and compliance systems. A regime 
can become deeper along one or more of these lines: by developing new institutions with greater authority, 
by evolving from non-legal to legal form, by establishing more stringent or precise obligations, and/or by 
developing stronger systems of compliance review.7
Institutional Evolution
One of the main ways in which a regime can deepen is through institutional developments. Over time, 
existing institutions may grow in authority or gain new powers, or new institutions may be created.
The evolution of the European human rights system illustrates the process by which institutions gain 
greater authority. Today, the European Court of Human Rights is so respected that it is difficult to remember 
that, for many years after its creation, the success of the Court was in doubt. It took eight years for the Court 
to be constituted after the adoption of the European Convention on Human Rights in 1950 , another two years 
before it decided its first case, and another eight years before it found its first violation of the Convention. As 
of 1970, the Court had issued only nine judgments, a rate of less than one a year, and many states still had 
not accepted the Court’s compulsory jurisdiction. The Court’s caseload was so light that one observer described 
it as a “sleeping beauty, frequently referred to but without much impact.”8 
Today, in contrast, the Court issues more than 1500 decisions per year and acts in essence as the 
“supreme court” of Europe with respect to individual human rights issues. Although the reasons are complex 
for the slow accretion of the Court’s authority, a basic factor is trust. Initially, states had little experience with 
international courts and were fearful of allowing an independent, untested decision-maker to review their 
6
The Evolution of Multilateral Regimes: Implications for Climate Change
human rights performance. But, as the European Court began to decide cases, it became a familiar and trusted 
institution, leading more states to accept its jurisdiction and more individuals to submit claims of human rights 
violations. The decision by states in the 1990s to abolish the Commission on Human Rights and establish a 
single consolidated judicial system to hear complaints, did not dictate a new institutional structure; rather, it 
reflected the evolution that had already occurred in practice over the previous two decades, through which the 
Court had become the central institution in the European human rights system.
The Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species (CITES) has also experienced significant 
institutional development, but of a different kind. It has evolved through the establishment of new institutions 
and mandates, rather than through the enhancement of existing powers. As Peter Sand notes, “Most of the 
institutional structures of CITES emerged only after the treaty’s entry into force, under the residual decision-
making powers of the Conference of the Parties.”9 Initially, CITES provided for a rather basic set of institutions, 
and did not include any compliance system. In 1979, states decided to establish the Standing Committee—in 
essence, an executive committee of the parties, which meets on a regular basis. Then, in a series of decisions, 
the Standing Committee asserted new powers—first, to review the performance of individual countries, and 
then to recommend that states impose trade suspensions against states with persistent compliance problems, a 
response to non-compliance that has no specific warrant in the treaty text itself.
Legal Form
 Sometimes, regimes begin as voluntary arrangements and evolve over time into legally-binding 
agreements.10 For example, in regulating trade in chemicals and pesticides, states began by negotiating 
two voluntary instruments in the late 1980s: the Food and Agriculture Organization Code of Conduct on the 
Distribution and Use of Pesticides and the London Guidelines for the Exchange of Information on Chemicals 
in International Trade. Both established, on a voluntary basis, a system of prior informed consent (PIC) for 
exports of hazardous substances. This voluntary PIC procedure for pesticides and chemicals was then made 
legally binding through the negotiation and adoption of the 1998 Rotterdam Convention on the Prior Informed 
Consent Procedure for Certain Hazardous Chemicals and Pesticides in International Trade.11 The PIC procedure 
for exports of hazardous wastes underwent a similar process of evolution, starting with the voluntary 1989 
Cairo Guidelines, which provided the basis for the adoption two years later of the Basel Convention on the 
Control of Transboundary Movements of Hazardous Wastes. Similarly, the regime regulating pollution of the 
North Sea has developed new standards primarily through ministerial declarations that established political 
commitments, which then provided the basis for legal regulation through the OSPAR Convention for the 
Protection of the Marine Environment of the North-East Atlantic.12
As these cases illustrate, non-legal arrangements can be a useful first step, helping to initiate a process 
of behavioral change. Although non-binding, they can increase public awareness, prompt domestic policy 
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debates, encourage social learning, create a sense of political obligation, lead to domestic implementing 
measures,13 and establish mechanisms to review national performance—helping to lay the groundwork for later 
legal regulation. Indeed, in some cases, non-binding arrangements have proven remarkably effective on their 
own, in the absence of any later treaty. The UN General Assembly on Driftnet Fishing, for example, has had a 
very significant impact in reducing high seas driftnet fishing.14 
But although non-legal arrangements can be important, converting them into a legally-binding form tends 
to strengthen a regime. Legal obligations represent a higher level of commitment by states than non-legal 
arrangements, with correspondingly higher reputational costs for violation. Moreover, they often provide for 
stronger compliance review internationally and, in some countries, can be enforced by domestic courts, thereby 
providing greater assurance of compliance. For these reasons, states typically take the negotiation of a legally-
binding agreement more seriously than a non-binding instrument, and the outcomes therefore better reflect 
what states are, in fact, prepared to do. In turn, by providing parties a higher degree of confidence that others 
will fulfil their obligations, binding commitments can create a greater sense of reciprocity, enabling countries 
to undertake stronger action than they might otherwise. 
Precision
Another way a regime may deepen is through greater precision. Regimes often begin by articulating 
very general standards and then provide greater precision over time, either through decisions of the parties 
or though additional legal instruments such as protocols or annexes. The Ramsar Convention, for example, 
requires states to promote the “wise use” of wetlands within their territory. But it is not at all self-evident 
what constitutes a “wise use” of a wetland. Through subsequent decisions, the Ramsar parties elaborated the 
meaning of “wise use” in much greater detail.15 Similarly, in the 1970s, the GATT adopted a series of side 
agreements that elaborated its quite general provisions on subsidies, dumping, government procurement, and a 
host of other issues.
The dimension of precision is independent of legal form, since legal agreements sometimes contain very 
vague standards, while non-binding instruments can sometimes set forth very precise rules. On the one hand, 
a treaty such as the Ramsar Convention contains a very vague standard for states to promote the wise use of 
their wetlands. On the other hand, the non-binding World Bank Guidelines on the Treatment of Foreign Direct 
Investment contain very detailed rules for the calculation of compensation in expropriation cases.16 
The evolutionary path from general standards to precise rules is the basis of the framework convention/
protocol approach, which has been used extensively in international environmental law, including in the 
climate change regime. First, states start with a framework convention that establishes a general system of 
governance, including the overall objective of the regime as well as basic institutions and procedures. Later, as 
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uncertainties are resolved and political will strengthens, states develop regulatory protocols that establish more 
precise obligations.17 
Regimes can also evolve towards greater precision through judicial decisions. Through their decisions in 
individual cases, the European Court of Human Rights has given a great deal of very specific content to the 
general provisions of the European Convention on Human Rights. UN human rights treaty bodies have similarly 
made legal obligations more precise both through their opinions in individual cases and through their adoption 
of “general comments.” 
What Makes a Regime Binding?
Although people often refer to a regime as “binding” or “non-binding,” as if “binding” were a unitary 
concept, there are several distinct elements of “bindingness” that contribute to a regime’s effectiveness.
Lawyers usually characterize an agreement as “binding” if it is adopted as a treaty, rather than as 
a political agreement or a voluntary code of conduct. Treaties establish legal obligations, whereas non-
legal agreements such as the Copenhagen Accord can establish only political commitments. Whether 
a decision of an international organization is legal in character depends on whether the organization is 
authorized by its founding treaty to make legally-binding decisions and, if so, whether it makes use of 
this power. 
 Alternatively, when we refer to a provision as “binding” we may mean that it is phrased in mandatory 
as opposed to hortatory terms—as a “shall” rather than a “should.” This element of bindingness differs 
from legal form, since treaties may use hortatory language (for example, Article 4.2(b) of the UNFCCC 
sets forth only an “aim” to return emissions to 1990 levels), while political agreements or decisions of 
international organizations may use mandatory language.
 Another important element of “bindingness” is precision. Provisions that set forth very general 
standards constrain behaviour less than precise rules. Compare, for example, a requirement that states 
use “best efforts to reduce their emissions, taking into account their capacity and circumstances,” with a 
requirement to reduce emissions by a specified amount.
Finally, the degree to which a regime establishes compliance or dispute settlement mechanisms 
contributes to its binding character. Some treaties don’t establish any review process or dispute 
settlement mechanism. Although their provisions are binding as a matter of legal form, they are less 
binding than similar agreements that establish strong systems of compliance review.
For more on these different dimensions of “bindingness” or “legalization,” see Judith Goldstein 
(2001); Bodansky (2009), ch. 5.
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Compliance/Dispute Settlement
Finally, a regime can become deeper through the development of stronger review, dispute settlement, 
and enforcement mechanisms.18 The trade regime is perhaps the best known example of this process of 
“judicialization.” Originally, the GATT didn’t provide for dispute settlement at all. When a system of dispute 
settlement began to emerge in the 1950s and 1960s, it was at first highly political. Cases were heard by ad 
hoc panels usually comprised of government officials who sought outcomes that would be acceptable to all of 
the parties concerned, in part because each party to a dispute retained the ability at each stage to block an 
outcome. Through a slow process of evolution in the 1970s and 1980s, the GATT dispute settlement process 
gained great authority, and in the 1994 Uruguay Round agreements, it was transformed into the WTO dispute 
settlement system, with compulsory jurisdiction, authority to make binding decisions, and a permanent 
appellate body comprised of independent jurists.
International criminal law has undergone a similar process of judicialization. Initially, war crimes and 
crimes against humanity were addressed in the 1990s by ad hoc tribunals established by the Security Council, 
such as the International Criminal Tribunal for Former Yugoslavia. These have now been institutionalized 
through the establishment by treaty of the International Criminal Court in 1998. 
Judicialization has gone the furthest within the European Community, where the European Court of Justice 
has become, in essence, a transnational rather than interstate judicial body, where “judges are insulated from 
national governments, societal individuals and groups control the agenda, and the results are implemented by 
an independent national judiciary.”19 
In the international environmental arena, CITES is an example of a regime that has evolved a strong 
compliance system, thus far primarily through decisions of the parties. Today, the CITES secretariat regularly 
reviews the adequacy of state’s implementing legislation, and the CITES Standing Committee recommends 
trade suspensions against countries with systematic compliance problems. 
Broadening
A regime can also evolve through the broadening of its membership or substantive scope, starting with a 
comparatively small number of like-minded states and then adding new members and new subject areas.
Starting with a narrow agreement has several benefits. First, the initial group is able to design the 
agreement the way it likes. The participants need to reach agreement only among themselves rather than 
satisfy a larger number of states. Second, a small initial membership makes the decision-making process more 
manageable, particularly if the substantive scope of the regime is comparatively narrow. The regime grows in 
membership and scope not by making compromises at the outset to satisfy a broad variety of states, but by 
proving over time that it works.
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The European Union is perhaps the best example of a treaty regime that has broadened over time. It 
began in the 1950s with relatively deep agreement among a small number of states, addressing only economic 
integration. Today, it has grown to 27 members, with competence over a wide range of economic, social and 
environmental issues.
The Antarctic Treaty System has similarly grown in both membership and substantive scope. Initially, it 
included a relatively small number of states engaged in Antarctic research, and focused on reducing conflict 
by demilitarizing the Antarctic and by putting the issue of territorial claims on hold. The regime’s restricted 
membership  led to questions about its legitimacy, but also contributed to its substantive success in managing 
the Antarctic. And this track record of success has, in turn, made the Antarctic Treaty System the presumptive 
forum for addressing new issues such as environmental protection and Antarctic tourism. The system has 
grown in legitimacy not by allowing anyone to join, but rather by demonstrating that it was an effective steward 
of the Antarctic and by gradually accepting new members as they demonstrated an interest in the region.20
The European human rights system illustrates one possible mechanism for broadening a regime, namely 
the use of an opt-in procedure. In joining the European Convention on Human Rights, states were not required 
to accept the individual complaint procedure or the compulsory jurisdiction of the European Court of Human 
Rights. Instead, these provisions were optional. In order to be bound by them, a state had to affirmatively 
opt in. As a result, even though many states did not accept these provisions initially, the provisions could be 
included in the Convention, thereby creating a pathway for the regime’s evolution. As confidence in the system 
grew, states decided one by one to accept the individual complaint procedure and the Court’s jurisdiction—
both of which are now accepted by all member states.
Regimes can also broaden from regional to global arrangements. Initially, a regional agreement may 
be easier to negotiate than a global agreement because countries within a region may have a greater sense 
of community and be more like-minded. The regional agreement can then become a model for a later 
global agreement. This process is similar to the development of regulations within federal states, where the 
constituent units often serve as laboratories, trying out different regulatory approaches that might serve as 
models for a national program. 21
Integrating
A final dimension of regime evolution is integration. Initially, states address a problem in a fragmented 
way, through a number of different instruments, institutions, or procedures. Over time, these become more 
integrated through institutional consolidation or linkages.
Many international regimes follow this evolutionary pathway. For example, in the LRTAP regime, states 
initially negotiated a series of protocols that addressed individual pollutants, including sulphur dioxide, 
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nitrogen oxides, and volatile organic compounds. Then, in 1999, they decided to integrate these separate 
protocols into the Gothenburg Protocol—a single comprehensive protocol that adopts an integrated multi-
pollutant approach. 
Similarly, in the regional regime to protect the North Sea, agreements addressing pollution from ocean 
dumping and from land-based sources were initially developed separately. Later, these two treaty regimes were 
merged in a single comprehensive regime: the OSPAR Convention on the Protection of the Marine Environment 
of the North-East Atlantic. 
The law of the sea has undergone a similar process of evolution. When states held the First UN Conference 
on the Law of the Sea in 1958, they adopted four separate agreements, each with different memberships, 
addressing different aspects of the law of the sea, including the territorial sea, the high seas, the continental 
shelf, and marine living resources. Fifteen years later, when they initiated the Third UN Conference on the Law 
of the Sea, they decided to negotiate a single comprehensive legal agreement addressing all aspects of the law 
of the sea.
In each of these cases, a more fragmented approach initially allowed countries—or groups of countries—
significant latitude in determining the pace and focus of their commitments. But, ultimately, governments found 
that stronger integration was useful in allowing closer coordination and delivering a higher level of effort.22 
Evolution along Multiple Dimensions
Thus far we have been considering these three different dimensions of evolution separately. But, of 
course, many regimes evolve along more than one dimension at once. The European Union, for example, has 
both broadened and deepened. The same is true of the Montreal Protocol, which has adopted progressively 
more stringent regulations to phase out an expanding list of ozone depleting substances, and has created a 
non-compliance procedure and a financial mechanism to support actions by developing countries, even as its 
membership has expanded significantly. Broadening and deepening often go together because they share a 
common cause: namely, growing confidence and trust in a regime, inspired by a track record of success. 
The trade regime is perhaps the best illustration of how a regime can evolve along all three dimensions 
concurrently. The GATT was originally intended simply to memorialize the tariff negotiations among 23 countries. 
It did not establish any formal organization. It had no provisions on amendment or dispute settlement. And even 
its legal status was unclear, since it came into effect only as a result of a “Protocol of Provisional Application.” 
But when the International Trade Organization (ITO) died as a result of U.S. refusal to join, the GATT became, de 
facto, the central instrument of the trade regime. And over the next 50 years, it underwent a remarkable process 
of evolution. It became an organization as well as an agreement. It developed new institutions such as the GATT 
Council, and a dispute settlement process. It spawned a series of “side agreements” that addressed particular 
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issues in greater depth. It expanded dramatically in membership. And, ultimately, it led to the adoption of the 
Uruguay Round Agreements, which established the WTO, put the trade regime on a more secure legal footing, 
established a highly developed system of dispute resolution, and integrated the various side agreements into 
a single package deal. The process was, of course, not unidirectional. Indeed it was marked at the outset by a 
tremendous setback—the rejection of the ITO. But eventually it evolved into an even stronger regime than the 
one originally envisioned.
13
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III. Evolution of the Climate Change Regime
Since climate change emerged as an international issue roughly 25 years ago, the international response 
has in many ways developed along an evolutionary pathway. In some key respects, however, it has proceeded in 
fits and starts—and, at this stage, has arguably stalled, and perhaps even moved backward.
The UNFCCC established an open-ended regime that contemplates an evolutionary process. In more than 
350 decisions by 15 COPs and five Meetings of the Parties (to the Kyoto Protocol), parties have taken many 
incremental steps establishing and strengthening bodies and procedures addressing issues such as transparency, 
finance, emissions crediting and adaptation.23 Yet, along one critical dimension—the legalization of countries’ 
core commitments—the regime has been marked by step-change and, more recently, retrenchment. It underwent 
a very rapid process of deepening—a “big bang”—through the negotiation and adoption of the Kyoto Protocol 
and its elaboration in the Marrakesh Accords. But since Kyoto’s entry into force, the push for a second round 
of binding commitments has thus far proved unsuccessful. Meantime, the broader regime complex has become 
more fragmented, with the emergence of initiatives such as the Major Economies Forum (MEF) only loosely 
connected with the UNFCCC. Most recently, the adoption of the Copenhagen Accord by world leaders might 
suggest that the regime is now moving in the direction of political rather than legal commitments.
When the UNFCCC was first negotiated in 1991–1992, the primary issue was whether to adopt binding 
targets and timetables to reduce developed country emissions, or to establish a non-binding system of 
“pledge and review.”24 Ultimately, parties struck a very careful compromise. In defining developed country 
commitments, the UNFCCC set only a hortatory numerical target,25 but it required developed countries to 
formulate and report on their national mitigation programs.26 The Convention also contemplated that these 
national reports would be subject to some form of review by the COP27—thus, in effect, establishing a system 
of “pledge and review,” as some states had favored. For proponents of this bottom-up approach, the rationale 
was that regular reporting and review would help encourage national action, develop a base of information, and 
gradually build confidence in the regime. However, the UNFCCC also implicitly acknowledged that this process 
might be insufficient, by calling in Article 4.2(d) for a review of the adequacy of its commitments at COP-1. 
The UNFCCC thus also left the door open to a top-down targets-and-timetables approach by creating a pathway 
that could lead to legally-binding targets.
At COP-1 in 1995, parties decided to pursue the targets-and-timetables approach that had been 
considered but not fully adopted in the UNFCCC. In doing so, they chose to follow the model of the ozone 
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regime, which developed very quickly, essentially over a five-year period from 1985 to 1990, and has 
proved highly successful.28 The negotiating mandate adopted at COP-1 led to the negotiation of the Kyoto 
Protocol in 1997, only three years after the UNFCCC’s entry into force. Four years later, parties adopted 
the Marrakesh Accords setting forth the detailed rules for how Kyoto would work. While in many subsidiary 
respects the regime was evolving incrementally, on the fundamental issue of legal form, its development was 
transformational, deepening in just a few years from pledge-and-review to binding targets-and-timetables.
In addition to deepening quite quickly, the UNFCCC adopted a comprehensive architecture from the 
outset. Rather than starting with particular dimensions of the emissions challenge and gradually broadening 
the focus, parties chose to set emission targets encompassing all GHGs and all sectors of the economy. This 
comprehensive approach was continued in the Kyoto Protocol, which establishes binding economy-wide targets 
covering a basket of GHGs—albeit for only a limited number of countries.
Finally, while developing rapidly, the UNFCCC has remained quite rigid in certain respects. The UNFCCC 
appropriately differentiates between the obligations of developed and developing countries, reflecting the 
principle of common but differentiated responsibilities and respective capabilities. But it also contemplated 
that this division of the world into developed and developing countries could evolve over time,29 for instance, 
with countries graduating from one status to the other as they develop. Instead, the division between Annex I 
(developed) and non-Annex I (developing) countries has became entrenched and has proven strongly resistant 
to evolution.
These factors have not prevented the climate change regime from continuing to evolve in important ways. 
A series of decisions have elaborated a system for the reporting and expert review of national communications 
and GHG inventories. The regime’s financial mechanism has grown, most recently with the operationalization 
of the Kyoto Protocol Adaptation Fund. The Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) Executive Board has 
established and oversees a set of institutional and procedural arrangements for the review and approval of 
offset-generating CDM projects. And adaptation efforts have been strengthened through steps such as the 
preparation and approval of national adaptation programmes of action for least developed countries.
But agreeing on the regime’s fundamental legal architecture for the post-2012 period has proved more 
problematic. As mandated under the Kyoto Protocol, the first Meeting of the Parties in 2005 launched 
negotiations for a second round of binding emission targets for developed countries, to apply after 2012. From 
the start, however, it was clear that at least some of the developed country parties to Kyoto were unwilling 
to assume new binding commitments without some form of parallel agreement covering the United States 
and the major emerging economies. So in Bali in 2007, a second track of negotiations was initiated under 
the UNFCCC, with the aim of a comprehensive “agreed outcome” two years later in Copenhagen.30 Although 
the Bali Action Plan did not specify what form of agreement was to be reached, the expectation grew among 
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parties and stakeholders that the product of Copenhagen was to be legally binding. Some favored a two-track 
outcome—with new targets under the Kyoto Protocol and a parallel agreement under the UNFCCC—while 
others argued for a single comprehensive agreement. In the end, however, neither of the formal negotiating 
tracks produced any form of agreement. The Copenhagen Accord instead emerged from an ad hoc political 
negotiation among heads of state and government. This nonbinding agreement, which was not formally adopted 
by the UNFCCC parties, elaborates a framework looking in many respects like the pledge-and-review approach 
considered earlier in the regime’s development.
As the formal UNFCCC process has struggled to make progress, the broader regime complex has 
diversified—or become more fragmented, depending on one’s view.31 Following its rejection of the Kyoto 
Protocol, the Bush Administration led the formation of alternative forums such as the Asia Pacific Partnership 
on Clean Development and Climate—a technology initiative encompassing seven countries and eight sectors—
and the Major Economies Meetings, which under the Obama Administration evolved into the MEF. In addition, 
states have pursued reductions in particular GHGs and sectors in more specialized forums, including the efforts 
to phase out hydrochlorofluorocarbons (HCFCs) and possibly hydrofluorocarbons (HFCs) through the Montreal 
Protocol, the recent discussions of black carbon in LRTAP, and the work on emissions from international 
transport in the International Maritime Organization (IMO) and the International Civil Aviation Organization 
(ICAO). The IMO is currently considering proposed ship efficiency standards, which could be adopted as an 
amendment to the International Convention on the Prevention of Pollution from Ships (MARPOL). Meanwhile, 
ICAO has adopted a goal of improving fuel efficiency by 2 percent a year and has established a process to 
consider the use of economic instruments such as emissions trading.
Moving from Copenhagen to COP-16 in Cancún, parties have generally conceded that binding outcomes 
are not on the immediate horizon; the aim instead is a “balanced package of decisions.” As political 
guideposts for these decisions, some parties point to the Copenhagen Accord while others emphasize the Bali 
Action Plan. Agreement is broadest on potential operational elements of the package: a new climate fund; 
mechanisms to address adaptation, technology and forestry; and a framework to measure, report, and verify 
countries’ actions and support for developing country efforts. More difficult issues include whether and how to 
inscribe detailed mitigation pledges, and how to address the issue of future legal form, including the fate of 
the Kyoto Protocol. 
There are, of course, many reasons why the evolution of the climate regime appears to have stalled in 
recent years. Most importantly, many of the key countries have yet to mobilize serious domestic efforts or 
are unprepared to accept significant international commitments—a problem only exacerbated by the global 
economic crisis. But part of the explanation for the current stalemate may be that the regime tried to deepen 
too quickly along the legal dimension—not in relation to the problem’s urgency, but ahead of what the political 
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traffic would bear. Arguably, the leap was too ambitious for a relatively young regime, which had not had time 
for trust to develop. A continued drive for binding commitments in the near term could produce a string of 
failures, and risk undermining the credibility and relevance of the UNFCCC process in the eyes of parties and 
observers alike.
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IV. Pathways Forward for the Climate Change Regime
Given where we are now, how might the climate change regime evolve in the future? Which evolutionary 
pathways are likely to be most fruitful? This section looks at possibilities both within and outside the UNFCCC 
process and how these might eventually be integrated through an overarching international agreement.
Evolution within the UNFCCC Process
The agenda for Cancún contains two major elements: a set of near-term operational or institutional issues, 
and broader questions about the ultimate direction and legal form of the climate regime. For many parties, 
clarity on the second set of issues is critical to guide decisions on the first, and to provide confidence that 
legally binding outcomes remain the ultimate objective. But even absent agreement on those longer-term 
issues, a set of concrete operational decisions could represent a significant step forward in the evolution of the 
climate regime.32 Such decisions could launch an institution-building phase that deepens the UNFCCC regime 
and helps to set the stage for a later legal agreement. The evolutionary path, in this scenario, would give 
priority initially to institutional development, then turn gradually to legalization.
For the near term, this approach would effectively institute the system of “pledge and review” rejected 
earlier in the regime’s development and resurrected in the Copenhagen Accord. Although the Accord remains 
formally outside the UNFCCC architecture, more than 80 countries, including all of the major economies, 
have made specific national mitigation pledges under the Accord, which have been recorded by the UNFCCC 
Secretariat. Inscribing these or revised pledges by way of a COP decision would anchor them within the 
UNFCCC process, lending them greater weight for many, although not establishing them as legally binding 
commitments. Starting in this manner would not “lock in” a voluntary approach or prejudge the ultimate legal 
form of the regime. As the experience of other regimes illustrates, voluntary arrangements can evolve into 
legally-binding commitments, as confidence in the regime grows. 
Whether or not parties can immediately agree on a formulation to formally inscribe mitigation pledges, 
they can take decisions that begin to establish the types of architectural elements envisioned under either 
or both the Bali Action Plan and the Copenhagen Accord. These include a stronger support structure for 
developing countries—including a new multilateral fund and mechanisms addressing adaptation, technology 
and forestry issues—and a more fully elaborated system for the measurement, reporting and verification (MRV) 
of countries’ mitigation actions and of support for developing country efforts.
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In many of these areas, parties may only be able to get as far as agreeing on a broad framework or initial 
steps, with further decisions needed to fully operationalize the new mechanisms or practices. In the case 
of MRV, for instance, parties might agree on an overall framework for reporting, review and “international 
consultations and analysis,”33 and a timeline for achieving more detailed decisions on each element. A new 
MRV framework would incorporate or build on existing UNFCCC practices with respect to mitigation actions—
most notably, the reporting and review of developed countries’ GHG inventories—as well as develop additional 
procedures for the reporting and verification of support to developing countries.
Elaborating these architectural elements could significantly strengthen the UNFCCC’s role as an 
international forum for action, as opposed to negotiation. A new multilateral fund, once established, would 
provide an important vehicle for scaling up support for developing countries even in the absence of binding 
financial commitments. A fully functioning MRV system—in which countries regularly report on their emissions 
and actions, with some form of international review or consultation—would significantly enhance transparency 
and provide some measure of accountability. These and other elements of an enhanced UNFCCC architecture 
would build parties’ confidence in one another and the regime itself, which could over time promote stronger 
efforts and enable further evolution culminating in binding commitments.
This type of evolutionary path does not depend on agreement about the ultimate nature or form of the 
climate regime. Indeed, initiating the process may be possible at this stage only if parties are willing to defer 
on such looming questions. Many parties continue to push strongly for a second commitment period under the 
Kyoto Protocol; some of them also favor a parallel binding agreement under the UNFCCC. Others, however, 
argue for a single comprehensive legal agreement. One possibility, at the point when parties are prepared to 
legalize their commitments, would be to initially adopt parallel agreements, and only later merge the two tracks 
in a single agreement.
 One quandary in pursuing an evolutionary approach, and deferring for now the question of ultimate legal 
form, is that it leaves the Kyoto Protocol in a state of limbo. It also suggests the greater likelihood of a “gap” 
between the existing Kyoto Protocol targets, which expire after 2012, and any subsequent commitments. To 
address this problem, Parties could choose to keep elements of the Kyoto Protocol operational beyond the 
first commitment period. For instance, the CDM could continue to generate credits for emission reductions 
in developing countries that could be used to meet the requirements of domestic or regional trading systems. 
Eventually, the CDM and other Kyoto institutions could be subsumed into the institutional structure established 
by a new legal agreement. In the interim, the “gap” could to some degree be addressed through a political 
agreement extending the existing Kyoto Protocol targets or through the provisional adoption of new ones.34
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Evolution outside the UNFCCC Process
In addition to evolution within the UNFCCC, the broader regime complex might also evolve through 
bilateral and plurilateral actions in other forums. As described in Section IV, this evolutionary process is 
already underway, through actions in the Montreal Protocol, LRTAP, the IMO and ICAO. Even if the UNFCCC 
continued to make progress, pursuing the climate change issue in other forums could complement evolution 
within the UNFCCC. But these non-UNFCCC processes would assume additional urgency should efforts within 
the UNFCCC stall. Progress may be easier to achieve initially through a more fragmented approach, in which 
countries are able to pursue specific initiatives in varying configurations of states. Under either scenario, by 
helping to diversify the portfolio of international climate change efforts, non-UNFCCC efforts would serve to 
reduce the risk of policy failure.
Some bodies such as the G-8, the G-20 and the MEF could continue to serve primarily as forums for 
political discussion and agreement, while others could be vehicles for more formal agreements and concrete 
action. To the extent that states are able to utilize existing institutions to address climate change, this could 
bring significant advantages. Existing institutions have established procedures and forums that can be used. 
Specialized institutions such as the ICAO and IMO often have significant expertise. Institutions with limited 
membership such as the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) may involve 
comparatively like-minded countries. And in institutions with a track record of success like the Montreal 
Protocol, participants have developed working relationships that instill trust and facilitate progress.
A number of existing forums have already begun to consider the climate change issue. Recently, the 
WTO hosted a joint conference on fossil fuel subsidies at which the WTO Deputy Director described fossil fuel 
subsidy reform as “one of the important tools in the hands of the international community to address climate 
change.”35 According to some estimates, subsidy reform could cut carbon emissions by up to 18 percent 
by 2050. A recent study by the International Institute for Sustainable Development proposes a roadmap for 
addressing fossil fuel subsidies that is essentially evolutionary in character, beginning with national initiatives 
and evolving into a legal agreement.36 The strategy would build off the G-20 initiative for fossil fuel subsidy 
reform and would involve, among others, the International Energy Agency (IEA), the OECD, and the WTO, 
which could provide the home for an eventual legal agreement.
Similarly, measures to address short-lived GHGs such as black carbon could potentially be addressed 
in a number of existing forums, including LRTAP, the Arctic Council and the IMO. In 2009, the parties 
to LRTAP established an Ad-Hoc Expert Group on Black Carbon, which met two times in 2010. The Arctic 
Council has also established a Task Force on Short-Lived Climate Forcers to assess black carbon emissions 
from Arctic Council countries and to recommend measures to reduce emissions. Currently, most Arctic 
Council countries do not have inventories of black carbon emissions, so the process will necessarily involve a 
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number of incremental steps, beginning with better inventories and including identification of policy measures 
and, ultimately, the development of international responses. The IMO could in parallel address black carbon 
emissions from ships.
Apart from initiatives in existing international organizations, smaller groups of countries could organize 
initiatives on an ad hoc basis to address particular issues such as forestry, finance, or technology research 
and development. Already, a joint Norwegian-French initiative to establish a partnership on REDD+ (reducing 
emissions from deforestation and forest degradation) has resulted in an Agreement on Financing and 
Quick-Start Measures to Protect Rainforests. The non-binding agreement, adopted by more than 50 states, 
establishes a framework for measures to reduce deforestation and has resulted in pledges of more than $4 
billion. Although the explicit aim is for this REDD+ framework to feed into the UNFCCC, it could potentially 
proceed on its own if the UNFCCC parties are unable to reach agreement. 
Many other climate-related issues might be addressed, by design or by default, outside the UNFCCC. As 
more countries move forward with domestic emissions trading systems, they likely will look for opportunities to 
link them through bilateral or plurilateral arrangements. If climate-related trade disputes begin to arise more 
frequently, they could easily lead to cases before the WTO, which might then be forced to consider rules to 
mediate between trade and climate policy. Another possibility would be to head off trade disputes—particularly, 
in energy-intensive industries such as steel and aluminum whose goods trade globally—by negotiating 
agreements to regulate GHG emissions on a sectoral basis.37
Bringing the Elements into an Integrated Framework
To a significant degree, the different strands of work within and outside the UNFCCC could proceed 
independently. International issues such as climate change are often addressed through “regime complexes” 
rather than by a single integrated agreement.38 The climate change regime complex—encompassing activities 
both within and outside the UNFCCC—might evolve for some time along a variety of tracks concurrently, as 
described above.
As the GATT Uruguay Round agreements illustrate, however, after states have engaged in a period of 
flexibility and experimentation, they may be ready to integrate the different pieces of a regime into a single 
framework, as they did in moving from the GATT a la carte approach to the single, integrated agreement that 
established the WTO. Similarly, as the climate change regime matures, states might find some elements of 
integration to be desirable.39
For example, integration of monitoring, reporting and verification would allow states to assess the overall 
level of international effort to combat climate change and evaluate whether additional actions are needed. A 
global agreement could expand the UNFCCC’s MRV system to encompass activities undertaken pursuant to 
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initiatives outside the UNFCCC, such as fossil fuel subsidy reform, measures to reduce black carbon emissions, 
and sectoral initiatives. A global framework could also facilitate integration of the global trading system by 
establishing a single “currency” of emission reduction units across the various mitigation efforts in different 
forums. This would promote economic efficiency by expanding the international emissions trading system. 
Ultimately, however, the levels of emissions reductions necessary to prevent dangerous climate change 
are likely to require the stronger levels of integration provided by binding commitments under a single 
comprehensive agreement. A comprehensive agreement would facilitate greater coordination and reciprocity, 
by allowing countries to make political tradeoffs between activities undertaken in different arenas. In general, 
states can be expected to do more to address climate change if their efforts are reciprocated by other states. 
Reciprocity gives states a greater incentive to undertake stronger action, since their efforts not only mitigate 
climate change directly, but also, in essence, buy action by others. 
The Evolution of Multilateral Regimes: Implications for Climate Change
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V. Conclusions
The international climate community does not face an either-or choice. Given its urgency and enormity, the 
only choice is to confront the climate challenge on all practical fronts. The real question, at any given moment, 
is which avenues offer the greatest promise of moving countries forward.
Nearly two decades ago, in adopting the U.N. Framework Convention on Climate Change, governments 
recognized the fundamentally global nature of the climate dilemma—and, what follows, the need for a global 
solution. Almost ever since, the primary thrust of the UNFCCC negotiations has been to establish, and then to 
extend, a legally-binding framework. This preoccupation has arguably overshadowed or even precluded other 
forms of multilateral cooperation within the UNFCCC framework. More worrisome, it has produced a state of 
perennial stalemate. In its present form, covering less than a third of global emissions, the Kyoto Protocol 
does not on its own provide a politically stable foundation for a post-2012 legal framework. And with other key 
players still unready, there is little prospect of another binding agreement—whether succeeding Kyoto, or in 
parallel—in the near future.
As an ultimate aim, a legally-binding agreement makes sense. While experience across multilateral arenas 
shows that non-binding agreements can produce strong action, it also demonstrates that binding commitments 
can lead to stronger efforts—particularly in addressing “public goods” such as the climate. The problem, 
perhaps, has been one of impatience. Driven by the urgency of reducing GHG emissions, parties have felt 
compelled to erect a binding framework as quickly as possible. The multilateral record, however, shows that 
oftentimes strong, stable and legally binding architectures are not simply hatched; they are built step by step 
over time.
This tenuous moment in the international effort, in the wake of Copenhagen’s “failure,” calls for a certain 
duality. It calls, on the one hand, for an appreciation of the importance in the long run of a binding framework 
to mediate and propel the collective effort against one of the most profound challenges ever to confront the 
international community. It calls, on the other hand, for a deeper appreciation that assembling that framework 
is an evolutionary process.
Deferring the goal of a binding architecture does not in any way mean relaxing the international effort 
to combat climate change. Within the UNFCCC, there is ample opportunity to establish mechanisms and 
practices that not only can deliver stronger resources, transparency and action in the near term, but can 
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grow the connective tissue of an ultimately binding framework. At the same time, parties should seize any 
opportunity for progress in parallel efforts outside the UNFCCC. 
It will be important through this phase not to lose sight of the longer-term objective; indeed, it would be 
helpful for parties to unequivocally affirm that their aim is a binding framework. And, to the degree that that is 
in fact their goal, parties would be well served to guard the legitimacy and credibility of the UNFCCC, so that it 
might remain the forum of choice once the global will is there.
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